MACY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/17/2021 3:19 PM

Notes
GIVE AND TAKE: STATE COURTS SHOULD BE
ABLE TO CERTIFY QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL
LAW TO FEDERAL COURTS
JOHN MACY†
ABSTRACT
For some time, federal courts faced with unresolved questions of
state law have been able to certify those questions to state courts for
resolution. In the past half-century, certification practice has exploded.
Nearly every state allows at least one federal court to certify questions
to its state courts, and some federal courts exercise the option
frequently. However, there is no analogous tool for state courts to
certify questions of federal law to federal courts. This Note argues that
the creation of such a tool would benefit both courts and litigants. Of
course, the considerations motivating certification to state courts, such
as Erie and abstention doctrines, are not equally present in the other
direction. But many of the benefits of certification would be reciprocal,
including enhanced uniformity, an increased sense of fairness to
litigants, and institutional comity between courts. Given these benefits,
this Note argues that there should be some give and take in certification
practice.

INTRODUCTION
State courts are often called upon to answer questions of federal
law. Since the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, many
federal issues must be resolved in a state forum. It could be because
the federal issue arises only as a defense to a state law claim,1 or
because the parties lack Article III standing to bring their claims in
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All errors are my own.
1. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (“It is not
enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that
the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States.”).
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federal court,2 or because the federal issue in a state law claim is not
sufficiently substantial.3 The possibilities are numerous. In other
circumstances, the federal courts may be accessible, but the litigants
may prefer to resolve their claims in state court. Whatever the case may
be, the United States’ federal system recognizes that the state courts
are “coequal parts of our national judicial system” that “give serious
attention to their responsibilities for enforcing the commands of the
Constitution.”4 However, while we can be confident in the competence
of the state courts to resolve issues of federal law,5 the Supreme Court
has noted that there are benefits to the resolution of federal issues in
federal court, as federal courts provide “experience, solicitude, and
hope of uniformity.”6 Indeed, one does not need to view the state
courts as inferior to recognize that there are benefits to the federal
forum.
Take federal patent law. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 grants the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over federal issues “arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents.”7 The highly specialized nature of patent
law, along with a need for uniformity in its administration, has
motivated Congress to centralize patent appeals in the Federal Circuit.8

2. State justiciability doctrines may allow for the resolution of cases in state courts that
would not make it into federal court due to standing defects. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State
Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001)
(discussing state justiciability doctrines); William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy”
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1990)
(arguing that state courts should adhere to Article III requirements when adjudicating questions
of federal law).
3. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)
(holding that a federal issue raised within a state law claim must be “actually disputed and
substantial” in order for the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over the issue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331).
4. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990).
5. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[W]e have consistently held that state
courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims
arising under the laws of the United States.”); see also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker,
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214 (1983) (“Our study indicates that state courts are no more
‘hostile’ to the vindication of federal rights than are their federal counterparts . . . .”).
6. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
8. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 823
(2005) (describing the motivating factors leading to the creation of the Federal Circuit, including
“[t]he need for national consistency” and the desire for “a national appellate court with
experience in the complexities of technology”).
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However, whether it be by unusual circumstances9 or by artful
pleading,10 patent issues will sometimes be barred from resolution in a
federal forum. In addition to frustrating Congress’s desire for
uniformity in the administration of the patent laws, this also presents
challenges for state courts. Since patent issues arise more frequently in
federal courts, state judges are less likely to be experienced in patent
law,11 and state courts have a comparatively smaller interest in their
resolution.12 In some cases, the question might be easily resolved by
looking to relevant law and federal court precedent. In other cases, a
state court might be faced with a genuinely novel issue of federal law.
One can imagine other scenarios where the state courts are likely
to have little interest or experience. A case might present a complex
issue involving the Internal Revenue Code13 or a similarly lengthy
federal statute. If the U.S. Supreme Court has resolved the issue, the
state courts are bound to follow.14 When lower federal court precedent
exists on the matter, the state court might be happy to simply follow
that.15 But when no federal precedent exists, the state court may have

9. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (holding that “legal malpractice claims
based on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law” even
though “such cases may necessarily raise disputed questions of patent law”).
10. See generally Ted D. Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court
Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 703 (1988) (arguing
that litigating patent issues in state court may be preferable for clients and describing various ways
to avoid federal jurisdiction).
11. There are some issues in which patent law is incidentally involved that the state courts
might answer somewhat frequently; the state law of trade secrets is one example. Id. at 713.
12. A court might be less interested in building precedent in an area of law that does not
typically arise within its jurisdiction.
13. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310–12
(2005) (describing a state law claim that raised an issue of federal tax law; although the Court held
that the issue in this case could be heard by a federal court, the issue could have easily been heard
by the state court as well if, for example, the defendant decided not to remove to federal court).
14. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that interpretations of federal law
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court have binding effect on the states, including state judicial
officers).
15. See, e.g., Devi v. Senior & Disabled Servs. Div., 905 P.2d 846, 848 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
(“We are not bound by decisions of the federal courts of appeals on issues of federal law
unresolved by the United States Supreme Court. . . . Nevertheless, we give those courts’ decisions
due regard. On our independent review of the issues presented, we find the [Ninth Circuit’s]
reasoning . . . persuasive . . . .”); State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enters., Inc., 984 N.E.2d 449, 462
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“Therefore, to maintain a uniform body of law in interpreting the Act, we
will follow [a decision of the federal courts of appeals] and apply its holding to our own analysis
of the Act . . . .”); see also Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower
Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 62–64 (2015)
(describing the differing approaches of state courts toward using lower federal court precedent).
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to undertake the labor of resolving the federal issue, while perhaps
contributing to later nonuniformity if the federal courts come to a
different conclusion.16 But what if, when presented with complicated
issues with which they have little interest, the state courts could ask the
federal courts how they would resolve the issue and then defer to the
federal court decision? Federal courts are capable of doing something
similar when they are faced with unresolved questions of state law
through the practice of certification.17
For some time, the federal courts have had the power to certify
questions of state law to state courts.18 In general, the procedure works
in the following way: when a federal court is asked to resolve a question
of state law that has not been definitively resolved by the relevant
state’s courts, most states allow the federal court to send the question
of state law to the state’s highest court.19 Instead of guessing how the
state’s highest court would resolve the issue20 or dismissing the case to
await a state court determination,21 the federal court isolates the
question of state law and asks the state’s highest court for an answer.22
Usually, the certified question is phrased as a discrete question of law23
and is accompanied by a statement of facts relevant to resolving the
issue.24 The state court then has discretion to decide whether to answer

16. See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree
on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 254–62 (2014) (describing the
consequences of conflicting interpretations of federal constitutional law between the federal
courts of appeals and the state courts). Although Professor Logan’s analysis focuses on
constitutional interpretations, some of the consequences would apply in the case of conflicting
statutory interpretations as well.
17. Federal courts are enabled to do so by state legislation. See infra notes 88–92 and
accompanying text.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts To Certify Questions of
State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1674 (2003). North Carolina is the only state that does not
allow federal courts to certify questions to its courts. JASON A. CANTONE & CARLY E. GRIFFIN,
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL
AUTHORIZING STATUTES 1 (2020).
20. As would be required by the Erie doctrine. See infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
21. As would usually be required by Pullman abstention prior to the availability of
certification. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Amaker v. King County, 540 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e respectfully
certify to the Washington Supreme Court the following questions: (1) Whether only those
individuals identified as ‘next of kin’ as defined by RCW § 68.50.160 at the time of the decedent’s
death have standing to bring a claim for tortious interference with a corpse?”).
23. E.g., id.
24. See, e.g., id. at 1013–14 (“Before addressing the questions certified to the Washington
Supreme Court, we first summarize the material facts and procedural history.”).
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the question.25 If the state court accepts the question, it will return an
opinion of law to the federal court,26 sometimes following briefing and
argument by the parties.27 The federal court can then defer to the state
court’s answer to resolve the original litigation.
While this procedure has existed for some time,28 there is no
analogous tool for state courts to certify questions to their federal
counterparts.29 At first glance, it is not hard to see why this imbalance
exists. Federal court certification of state law questions is motivated in
part by doctrines that require the federal courts to defer to state
courts,30 whereas, in contrast, state courts are largely expected to
resolve federal questions on their own.31 Even so, there are many
contexts in which a state court may wish to defer to federal courts.
Indeed, many of the benefits that federal courts receive from
certification could apply equally to the state courts. Certification gives
courts a discretionary tool for conserving judicial resources, furthers
institutional comity, and enhances fairness to litigants.32
Furthermore, if there is value to the resolution of federal issues in
federal court, as some courts and scholars have argued,33 then there is
reason to support certification as an additional avenue for federal
issues arising in state court to reach a federal forum. As some

25. See, e.g., Abrams v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n, 263 S.E.2d 103, 106–07 (W. Va. 1980)
(recognizing the benefits of certification but refusing to answer a certified question because
resolution of state law issues would not be dispositive).
26. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 240–49 (Cal. 2011) (answering a certified
question from the Ninth Circuit and providing a discussion of the legal issues).
27. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.27(e) (2021) (“If the certification
is accepted . . . . The Clerk of the Court shall notify the parties of the time periods for filing of
printed briefs and briefs in digital format, if any, and calendaring of argument, if any, directed by
the Court.”).
28. See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
29. Andrew D. Bradt, Grable on the Ground: Mitigating Unchecked Jurisdictional
Discretion, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1153, 1209–10 (2011) (“[S]o far, there is no reciprocal ability
for state courts to certify questions of federal law to a federal court.”).
30. See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 736 (2009) (holding that states may not use
jurisdictional rules to discriminate against federal rights or causes of action).
32. These benefits are addressed at greater length later in this Note. See infra Part II.B.1.
33. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); see
also Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 124–32 (2009) (recognizing the expertise of federal
judges in resolving issues of federal law, but also pointing out the limits of that expertise); Erwin
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67,
85 (“[F]ederal courts are comparatively more skilled than state courts at interpreting and applying
federal law . . . .”).
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commentators note, it is increasingly rare for the Supreme Court to
review state court decisions involving federal issues.34 Certiorari to
state courts makes up a small portion of an already miniscule Supreme
Court docket.35 Practically speaking, state courts are the final word on
federal law for many litigants. Certification, however, could provide
the federal courts with additional opportunities to consider and resolve
issues of federal law, to the benefit of both the litigants and the judicial
system.
However, the prospect of enabling state courts to certify questions
of federal law to the federal courts, or “reverse certification” as some
scholars call it,36 has received little academic attention.37 From my
review, only two scholars have given the proposal serious attention,
and even then, only as short proposals designed to remedy a narrow
problem.38 This Note endeavors to give reverse certification focused
consideration. Furthermore, this Note will focus especially on the
benefits of reverse certification to judicial administration, and not just
the benefits to litigants who aspire to access a federal forum.
Ultimately, this Note will conclude that enabling the state courts to
34. Jeffrey S. Sutton & Brittany Jones, The Certiorari Process and State Court Decisions, 131
HARV. L. REV. 167, 169–72 (2018) (collecting data demonstrating the rarity of Supreme Court
review of state court decisions and noting that “[t]he data in more recent Terms suggests a greater
disparity”).
35. See id. at 167 (noting the small percentage of petitions for certiorari that reach the
Court’s merits docket).
36. It appears that the term “reverse certification” may have first been used by Judge Bruce
M. Selya. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . ., 29 SUFFOLK L. REV. 677,
685 (1996). The term has caught on in subsequent scholarship. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1160
(“[F]ederal courts should adopt a procedure allowing state courts to certify federal questions in
their cases to the federal circuit courts—a form of ‘reverse certification.’”).
37. Most scholarship considering reverse certification has given the idea only very brief
attention. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 73 n.367
(considering, in a footnote, whether allowing state courts to certify questions to the Federal
Circuit could help break the “cycle of removal” in patent litigation); Mitchell N. Berman, R.
Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property
Rights: How To “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1114 n.378
(2001) (considering, in a footnote, the proposal that state courts could certify questions of
intellectual property law); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable
Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1298–99 (2003) (proposing that Congress should shift more
criminal cases to state courts, and that state courts should be able to certify complicated questions
of federal law that arise); Selya, supra note 36 (entertaining and criticizing “reverse certification”
as a proposal).
38. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1207–19 (considering reverse certification as a potential
solution to the tendency of federal district courts to reject jurisdiction over federal issues arising
in state law claims under the Grable test); Logan, supra note 16, at 271–78 (arguing that Congress
should enable state courts to certify questions to the U.S. Supreme Court when a split of authority
occurs between state courts and lower federal courts).
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certify questions of federal law would be both practically and
symbolically desirable. Doing so would provide benefits to both state
and federal forums, and it would strengthen institutional comity and
reciprocity between both courts. This latter benefit will result even if
certification is used sparingly by the state courts. Given these benefits,
this Note advocates for some give and take in modern certification
practice.
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
history of certification in the federal courts and explains how
certification of questions of state law has become a mainstream
practice. Part II then focuses on reverse certification from a policy
perspective and considers practical elements: what the benefits of
reverse certification might be, how it might work, and when it might be
utilized. Part III then considers the constitutionality of reverse
certification and concludes that a reverse certification procedure could
be consistent with Article III restrictions on federal judicial power.
I. CERTIFICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Although infrequently discussed, certification comes in many
forms. Federal courts can certify to state courts; state courts can certify
to other state courts;39 and intermediate appellate courts can certify to
courts of last resort.40 Generally, any discussion of federal certification
procedure likely refers to the certification of questions of state law to
state courts. However, this is not the exclusive avenue for federal
certification. Indeed, the federal courts of appeals have been capable
of certifying questions directly to the U.S. Supreme Court for
centuries.41 This Part will discuss the two federal certification
procedures that currently exist. Section A will begin by discussing
certification from the federal courts of appeals to the Supreme Court,
which is the older of the two. Section B will then discuss certification
from federal courts to the state courts, which has become far more
common.
39. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of Law: A Valuable
Process in Need of Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 125 (1992) (describing interstate certification and
advocating for expanding its use).
40. For example, the federal circuit courts of appeals can certify questions to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). Some states also have procedures that allow state
intermediate appellate courts to certify questions to the state’s highest court. See, e.g., FLA. R.
APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) (allowing Florida’s intermediate appellate courts to certify questions
“of great public importance” to the Florida Supreme Court).
41. See infra Part I.A.
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A. Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court
Although certification to the Supreme Court has fallen out of
practice, there are good reasons to discuss this old variety of
certification before considering a system of reverse certification. The
practice demonstrates that certification exists as a tried-and-true
method for resolving federal issues in federal courts, albeit one that has
been neglected for some time.
Certification to the Supreme Court predates the federal courts as
we know them today. In 1802, when the first statute enabling
certification to the Supreme Court was passed,42 each of the six circuit
courts consisted of only two judges: a Justice of the Supreme Court
riding circuit, and “the district judge of the district, where such court
shall be holden.”43 The first certification statute allowed parties to
request certification when “the opinions of the judges shall be
opposed.”44 Thus, it appears that certification was originally a response
to intracircuit splits between two-judge panels. In those days,
certification was sometimes the only method for a case to reach the
Supreme Court for review.45
In 1891, the passing of the Evarts Act46 introduced the modern
courts of appeals.47 Even though the Act provided for the writ of
certiorari as a new way to bring cases before the Supreme Court,48 the

42. See Kevin G. Crennan, The Viability of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2025, 2028 (2011) (“Certification has deep historical roots that extend as
far back as 1802.”).
43. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157–58.
44. Id. at 159.
45. See Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59
CATH. U. L. REV. 483, 486 (2010) (“For a long time, certification was the exclusive statutory
method by which many cases could reach the Supreme Court.”).
46. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 826. The Act is commonly known as the
“Evarts Act” in reference to its primary sponsor: Senator William M. Evarts. See Paul D.
Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late Century View, 1987 S.C. L. REV. 411, 414–
16 (describing Evarts’s sponsorship of the bill and the compromises made to secure its passing).
47. See generally ch. 517, 26 Stat. at 826 (establishing the “circuit courts of appeals” as
intermediate appellate courts).
48. Id. at 828 (“[I]n any such case as is hereinbefore made final in the circuit court of appeals
it shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any such case
to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review . . . .”); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643,
1650–51 (2000) (noting the introduction of the writ of certiorari in the 1891 Act).
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Act also explicitly retained the practice of certification.49 The Judiciary
Act of 1925 (“1925 Act”) again retained certification,50 and the
statutory basis for certification has remained substantially the same
ever since.51 The current statutory language providing for certification,
in 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), provides:
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by the following methods: . . . (2) By certification at any time by a
court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as
to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the
Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire
record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.52

In the decade following the 1925 Act, certification was used with some
regularity. Between 1927 and 1936, “courts of appeals issued seventytwo certificates.”53 However, certification declined after 1930, with
only sixteen certificates having been issued since then.54 The Supreme
Court has accepted only four certificates since 1946, with the most
recent being in 1985.55
What happened? If there is a suspect in certification’s death, it
would be the Supreme Court itself.56 The Court made clear in several
cases that certification could be used only in very limited
circumstances.57 This led to a general reluctance to certify among

49. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (“[T]he circuit court of appeals at any time may certify to the Supreme
Court of the United States any questions or propositions of law concerning which it desires the
instruction of that court for its proper decision.”).
50. As the Judiciary Act of 1925 provides,
In any case, civil or criminal, in a circuit court of appeals, or in the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, the court at any time may certify to the Supreme Court of the
United States any questions or propositions of law concerning which instructions are
desired for the proper decision of the cause.
Judiciary Act of 1925 (Judges’ Bill), ch. 229, § 239, 43 Stat. 936, 938.
51. See Nielson, supra note 45, at 485–86 (noting that the current version of the certification
statute “has been part of the United States Code since 1948, and a ‘substantially’ identical version
has existed since 1925”).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).
53. Nielson, supra note 45 (quoting Hartnett, supra note 48, at 1710).
54. Id.
55. Hartnett, supra note 48, at 1712 & n.404.
56. See Nielson, supra note 45, at 488 (“The question, then, is not whether certification is
dead, but why it is dead. Or, rather, who killed it? The Supreme Court did . . . .”).
57. See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (holding that an intracircuit
split was not an “occasion for invoking so exceptional a jurisdiction of this Court as that on
certification”); Crennan, supra note 42, at 2040–41 (collecting cases in which the Supreme Court
has restricted the use of certification).

MACY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/17/2021 3:19 PM

916

[Vol. 71:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

federal appellate judges.58 One motivating factor in the Court’s
decision to restrict certification was likely the fact that certification
historically entailed mandatory review.59 Although incapable of
dismissing certified questions for discretionary reasons, the Court
could nonetheless control its docket by arguing that certification in a
given case was legally improper.60 Certification’s death was all but
confirmed when the Supreme Court refused to answer a question
certified by the Fifth Circuit in 2009, with only Justices John Paul
Stevens and Antonin Scalia dissenting from the refusal to answer.61
Some scholars, notably Professors Amanda Tyler and Aaron
Nielson, lament the Supreme Court’s reluctance to answer certified
questions and argue for a resurgence of the practice.62 However,
regardless of whether certification to the Supreme Court returns, the
history of the practice provides a background for certified questions in
the federal courts. The procedure indicates that it would not shake the
foundations of the federal judiciary to suggest that a federal court could
answer a federal question certified to it in the context of an ongoing
litigation. If anything, the decline of certification to the Supreme Court
can be attributed not to any constitutional defect of certification, but
rather to the Supreme Court’s desire to control its docket.63 Of course,

58. See Nielson, supra note 45, at 489–91 (describing the reluctance of circuit courts of
appeals to certify questions to the Supreme Court); Taylor v. Atl. Mar. Co., 181 F.2d 84, 85 n.2
(2d Cir. 1950) (“We will not certify the question to the Supreme Court. . . . It is not for us to decide
what matters are of enough importance to require decision by that court; the control of its docket
should rest exclusively in its own hands.”).
59. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (1930) (“Petitions for certiorari the Court can deny, but
questions certified must be answered.”).
60. As the Wisniewski court noted,
It is also the task of a Court of Appeals to decide all properly presented cases coming
before it, except in the rare instances, as for example the pendency of another case
before this Court raising the same issue, when certification may be advisable in the
proper administration and expedition of judicial business.
353 U.S. at 902.
61. United States v. Seale, 558 U.S. 985, 985 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. See generally Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for
Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310 (2010) (arguing for a limited revival of certification);
see Nielson, supra note 45, at 490–92 (“[m]ourning” the death of certification); Tracey E. George
& Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58
DUKE. L.J. 1439, 1450–51 (2009) (arguing that “certification today could be even more valuable
than it was a hundred years ago”).
63. Members of the Court have at times been forthright about their desire to reduce
caseloads on the Court. Cf. Warren Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 ABA
J. 442, 442 (1983) (“Today I will focus on only one subject, which is perhaps the most important
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there are constitutional considerations involved when a federal court
answers a certified question, and some of those concerns have been
present when the Supreme Court has considered its own power to
answer certified questions.64 But such concerns do not preclude
certification altogether.65
While certification to the Supreme Court may be dead, one form
of certification is very much alive in the federal courts—certification of
questions of state law to state courts. The next Section will focus on
this form of certification.
B. Certification of State Law Questions to the State Courts
In 1945, the Florida legislature passed a statute allowing the
Florida Supreme Court to receive and answer certified questions from
certain federal courts.66 This act of “rare foresight”67 went completely
unnoticed until 1960, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided to certify
a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court.68 This was a
watershed moment for federal/state certification; in the decade
following, several states adopted certification statutes of their own, and
the Uniform Law Commission recommended a uniform certification
statute.69
By many accounts, the adoption of certification statutes was
driven by two problems: the onerous litigation costs imposed on
litigants by federal abstention doctrines and the challenges of
ascertaining state law following the Erie doctrine.70 Federal abstention
single, immediate problem facing the judiciary, and that is the caseload of the Supreme
Court . . . .”).
64. The Court’s primary concern has been that a certified answer could be a prohibited
exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction. See White v. Turk, 37 U.S. 238, 239 (1838) (“This
certificate, therefore, brings the whole cause before this Court; and, if we were to decide the
questions presented, it would, in effect, be the exercise of original, rather than appellate
jurisdiction.”); Crennan, supra note 42, at 2033–39 (discussing constitutional issues involved in
certification to the Supreme Court). This issue will not be discussed further in this Note.
65. See infra Part III.
66. Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands
of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIA. L. REV. 717, 717 (1969).
67. Clay v. Sun Ins. Off. Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
68. See id. (deciding to utilize Florida’s certification statute).
69. Mattis, supra note 66, at 721.
70. See id. at 718 (discussing certification in relationship to abstention doctrine); Gregory L.
Acquaviva, The Certification of Unsettled Questions of State Law to State High Courts: The Third
Circuit’s Experience, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 377, 381 (2010) (describing certification of state law
questions as “precipitated by the Erie doctrine”); M. Bryan Schneider, “But Answer Came There
None”: The Michigan Supreme Court and the Certified Question of State Law, 41 WAYNE L. REV.
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doctrines, such as Pullman abstention,71 require federal courts, when
certain circumstances are present, to halt or dismiss federal litigation
so that a controversy may be resolved in a state court.72 Certification
provides an alternative that is more efficient on its face: instead of
forcing a litigant to start over in state court, the federal court can certify
the question of state law directly to the state’s highest court. Once the
state court returns a definitive answer, the federal court can resolve the
remaining federal issues if necessary.
While abstention imposes burdens on aspiring federal litigants,
the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins73 imposes
burdens on the federal courts. Erie, of course, requires federal courts
to follow the decisions of state courts when resolving questions of state
law.74 In some cases, applicable state decisional law is unclear or
conflicting, and the federal court is called upon to resolve an open
question of state law.75 In such a scenario, federal courts generally
approach the problem by predicting how the state’s highest court
would resolve the issue, a so-called “Erie guess.”76 As one federal judge
put it, this process is “laborious, often onerously so.”77 In unclear cases,
the Erie inquiry can require a judge to “exhaustively analyze[] all the
273, 277 (1995) (describing “the difficulties faced by federal courts in ascertaining state law and
the Erie and abstention doctrines” as “the background which gave rise to the use of the certified
question”).
71. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
72. See id. at 501 (holding that a federal district court ought to “sta[y] its hands” if the
resolution of a state law issue by a state court “cannot be pursued with full protection of the
constitutional claim”).
73. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
74. Id. at 79 (“[T]he authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice
adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should
utter the last word.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928))).
75. See Geri J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1988) (describing the circumstances in which a federal court must resolve a
question of state law on its own).
76. Haley N. Schaffer & David F. Herr, Why Guess? Erie Guesses and the Eighth Circuit, 36
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1625, 1626 (2010) (describing the Eighth Circuit’s approach to the “Erie
guess”); Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295–96 (1961) (instructing the lower federal
court to determine the relative weights that the New York Court of Appeals would accord to
authoritative sources when answering a California state law question); Phansalkar v. Andersen
Weinroth & Co., L.P., 344 F.3d 184, 199 (2d. Cir. 2003) (“Where the substantive law of the forum
state is uncertain or ambiguous, the job of the federal courts is carefully to predict how the highest
court of the forum state would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity.” (quoting Travelers Ins. Co.
v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994))).
77. J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE
L. REV. 317, 321 (1967).
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state court cases even remotely in point,”78 and perhaps even seek out
law review articles, treatises, and decisions from other states “which
might impress and influence the state high court in deciding the issue
today.”79
While the “predictive” approach to the Erie inquiry has received
some pushback,80 Erie can put federal judges to a time-consuming task.
Certification provides an alternative. Instead of predicting what a state
court will do, the federal court can simply ask the state court. But
certification does more than save federal courts’ time;81 it gives state
courts an opportunity to resolve unclear state law issues that arise in
federal court. Without certification, federal courts may sometimes
serve as the final word on open questions of state law, at least so far as
the litigants are concerned.82 Since there is no avenue to appeal state
law issues from federal court to a state high court, certification provides
a state with additional autonomy over how its law is applied.
There are other benefits to certification that merit mentioning.
Certification provides state courts with more opportunities to develop
state law, as it could present factual scenarios that the state courts
would have otherwise not seen.83 It allows for unresolved legal issues
to be answered by the same body whether they arise in federal or state
court, which enhances uniformity and could reduce forum shopping.84
According to several federal and state judges, certification also

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 710–15
(1995) (discussing some of the jurisprudential issues involved in the predictive model and
suggesting an alternative); Yonover, supra note 75, at 8 (describing one federal judge’s relatively
idiosyncratic approach to the Erie inquiry).
81. The time saved here refers to the time the federal courts would have otherwise spent
conducting the laborious Erie inquiry. Certification is time-consuming in another sense since it
prolongs litigation while the federal courts wait for a state court’s answer. See Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[Certification] entails more delay
and expense than would an ordinary decision of the state question on the merits by the federal
court.”); Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 919 F.3d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 2019) (Clay, J.,
concurring) (stating that resort to certification in diversity cases “serve[s] little purpose other than
to needlessly delay resolution of the ultimate issues in the case”).
82. While federal court decisions on open questions of state law are not binding authority in
future cases, the judgments will nonetheless bind the parties involved.
83. See Nash, supra note 19, at 1697 (asserting that certification “gives the state judiciary the
opportunity to rule on important issues of state law in cases in which it might not otherwise have
had the chance”).
84. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1544 (1997).
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promotes institutional comity between the courts.85 Lastly, there may
be an enhanced sense of fairness among litigants when a state law
question is resolved by the court positioned to deliver a definitive
answer with binding effect on future litigation.86
Driven by Pullman, Erie, and federalism concerns, certification of
state law questions has become a relatively common practice in the
federal courts. As of this writing, forty-nine states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Mariana
Islands all have certified question statutes.87 North Carolina is the only
state without such a statute.88 Although there is some variation, each
statute authorizes certification from at least one federal court of
appeals,89 and all but one authorize certified questions from the U.S.
Supreme Court.90 Some states accept certified questions from the
federal district courts or the U.S. bankruptcy courts as well.91
With certification now widely available, data shows that the
federal courts use the tool quite frequently. A recent study examined
certification practices in the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits from 2010
to 2018.92 In that span, the Ninth Circuit certified the most questions,
eighty-nine total, of which 80 percent were accepted by the state high

85. See John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law,
41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 457 (1988) (recounting the position of several federal and state judges that
“the federal courts’ use of certification improves federal-state comity”). The comity that might
result from certification is discussed later in this Note. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing, in the
fourth paragraph, how certification might advance institutional comity between courts).
86. See Nash, supra note 19, at 1698 (“[C]ertification offers a federalism benefit to litigants
in the form of ‘fairness.’ Specifically, it provides federal court litigants the benefit of a resolution
of their case based upon definitive state law.”); see Selya, supra note 36, at 690 (claiming that
fairness concerns are the “best argument in favor of certification,” but noting that “litigants do
not have an entitlement to something identifiable in the abstract as a ‘right’ answer”).
87. CANTONE & GRIFFIN, supra note 19.
88. Id. The North Carolina legislature has considered allowing certification, but legislation
has yet to be passed despite support from judges on the Fourth Circuit and a few justices on the
North Carolina Supreme Court. See Matthew Nis Leerberg, Bill Would Allow Federal Courts To
Certify Questions to the North Carolina Supreme Court, FOX ROTHSCHILD (Feb. 23, 2017), https:/
/ncapb.foxrothschild.com/2017/02/23/bill-would-allow-federal-courts-to-certify-questions-to-thenorth-carolina-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/WE6J-9JBV] (discussing a proposed bill that
would enable the North Carolina Supreme Court to answer certified questions).
89. CANTONE & GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 3.
90. Id. at 2. The exception is the New Jersey statute, which allows certified questions only
from the Third Circuit. N.J. CT. R. 2:12A-1.
91. CANTONE & GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 3–4.
92. JASON A. CANTONE & CARLY GRIFFIN, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW
IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD, SIXTH, AND NINTH CIRCUITS (2010–2018) 1
(2020) [hereinafter CERTIFICATION IN THE THIRD, SIXTH, AND NINTH CIRCUITS].
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court (in most instances, the Supreme Court of California).93 The Sixth
Circuit saw much less certification activity; between 2010 and 2018, the
Sixth Circuit certified only ten questions to state courts, of which only
six were accepted.94 The Third Circuit certified thirty-one questions in
the years surveyed, and experienced a higher rate of response from the
state courts, with 87 percent acceptance.95 These numbers indicate a
wide variation in certification practices among the courts of appeals.
They also indicate that certification has become relatively
commonplace in some circuits.
The Second Circuit also has a reputation for frequent certification.
Between 2012 and 2017, the Second Circuit certified thirty-nine
questions to state courts, thirty-one of which were directed at the New
York Court of Appeals.96 This is perhaps in part due to the support of
Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, who once implored the federal
courts to “certify, certify, certify”97 whenever a question of state law is
“even possibly in doubt.”98 The Second Circuit certified at least seven
questions to the New York Court of Appeals alone in 2020, indicating
that certification trends in the Circuit continue at a steady pace.99
The courts of appeals also vary in the criteria they use to
determine whether to certify a question of state law. Although the
Supreme Court has endorsed certification,100 it has given little guidance
on what factors lower courts should consider when deciding whether
to certify. In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,101 for example,
the Court held that a “[n]ovel, unsettled question[] of state law” was
“necessary before federal courts may avail themselves of state
certification procedures.”102 But the Court has also made clear that

93. Id. at 5–9.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. at 7.
96. Scott A. Chesin & Karen W. Lin, Certification from the Second Circuit to the N.Y. Court
of Appeals: A Guide, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 10, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/almID/1202783229410/Certification-From-the-Second-Circuit-to-the-NYCourt-of-Appeals-A-Guide [https://perma.cc/EVS9-SECD].
97. Calabresi, supra note 37, at 1301.
98. Id.
99. Certified
Questions
(500.27),
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://web.archive.org/web/
20210320231127/https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/certquest.htm [https://perma.cc/GAR8-FPFY].
100. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (“[Certification] does, of
course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism.”).
101. Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
102. Id. at 79.
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resort to certification is not obligatory in such circumstances.103 The
Court has said little else about what factors inform a discretionary
decision to certify. In Arizonans, the Court found that the requests for
certification in that case “merited more respectful consideration than
they received” by the courts below “[g]iven the novelty of the question
and its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona’s business.”104
Endowed with wide discretion by the Supreme Court, the circuits
developed their own criteria for deciding whether to certify. The Ninth
Circuit, for example, held that “[t]he certification procedure is reserved
for state law questions that present significant issues, including those
with important public policy ramifications, and that have not yet been
resolved by the state courts.”105 The Ninth Circuit also noted that
certification should not be used because a legal issue is “difficult,” but
rather because of “deference” to the state court.106 Other circuits have
had more difficulty developing a test. In the Sixth Circuit, for example,
a recent decision not to certify triggered three different opinions
discussing when the Circuit should take advantage of certification.107
The competing opinions highlighted the tension between two values at
stake in the decision whether to certify: the desire for uniform
application of state law on one hand, and the obligation of federal
courts to resolve state law issues in diversity jurisdiction on the other.108
Without consensus, there is some uncertainty regarding what factors
inform a decision to certify in that circuit.
As these cases demonstrate, certification depends on judicial selfregulation. State certification statutes may include some constraints,

103. Schein, 416 U.S. at 390–91 (“We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law
and where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory.”).
104. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 78.
105. Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003); see Childress v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 978 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying the Kremen v. Cohen factors to determine
whether to certify).
106. Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1037.
107. See generally Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 919 F.3d 992 (6th Cir. 2019)
(denying rehearing en banc of a decision not to certify).
108. See id. at 993–94 (Clay, J., concurring) (“[W]hen diversity jurisdiction is properly
invoked, federal courts have a ‘duty . . . to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to
the rendition of a judgment.’” (omission in original) (quoting Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943))); id. at 996 (Bush, J., dissenting) (“[A] federal judge’s assessment of
state law ‘cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination’ if the state courts have not
yet definitively resolved an issue.” (quoting R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
499 (1941))).
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such as restricting which courts can certify109 or mandating that the
state law questions be potentially determinative in the federal case,110
but certifying courts have wide latitude within those boundaries.
And it is not just federal courts that are controlling the flow of
certified questions. State courts can also guide the process when
deciding whether to accept a certified question.111 In fact, both courts
have strong incentives to ensure that the process runs smoothly.
Federal courts want to avoid wasting time by certifying questions that
will not be answered, and state courts want to avoid wasting time
poring over certified questions that they will ultimately reject. There is
reason to expect, then, that certification would become a more efficient
process over time, as federal and state courts communicate the desired
balance. Indeed, some of the data above suggests that the process has
already become quite efficient in some circuits.112
The above discussion makes clear that certification has become a
normal practice in at least some federal courts. This leads to the
primary question this Note considers: Why don’t the federal courts
accept certified questions themselves? As noted previously, there is no
shortage of federal questions that struggle to find their way into federal
court.113 To be sure, certification in general is subject to a fair amount
of criticism,114 but if certification is here to stay, there are reasons to
consider making certification a two-way street. The next Part will
consider what so-called reverse certification might look like and what
its possible benefits might be.

109. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 2:12A-1 (“The Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified
to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. P. 407 (allowing certification of state law questions “which
may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court”).
111. State courts sometimes make their reasons known when rejecting a federal court’s
certified question, but not always. See, e.g., Abrams v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n, 263 S.E.2d 103,
106–07 (W. Va. 1980) (recognizing the benefits of certification but refusing to answer a certified
question because resolution of state law issues would not be dispositive); see also Schneider, supra
note 70, at 315 (“The Michigan Supreme Court, to say the least, is not very receptive to the
certified question. Not only does the court refuse to answer most questions, but it generally fails
to state the reasons for its refusal.”).
112. Between 2010 and 2018, 87 percent of the Third Circuit’s questions were accepted by the
relevant state court. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (referencing this statistic).
113. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (introducing this struggle).
114. See generally Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114 (2009)
(arguing that certification furthers an erroneous view that “state and federal law ought to be
isolated into separate spheres of jurisprudence”); Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for
Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 94 VA. L. REV. 1869, 1885–90 (2008) (arguing that there are
downsides to allowing cases to be “decompose[d]” for the purpose of certification).
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II. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW
Given that federal and state judges have praised certification in
the past,115 it seems odd that there has never been much interest in
reversing the procedure. Perhaps it is because the primary motivators
for certification to state courts, namely abstention doctrine and the
Erie inquiry, do not move in the opposite direction. However, as will
be shown more extensively below,116 many of the benefits of
certification procedure could flow in both directions. For example,
reverse certification would allow the state courts to conserve judicial
resources by allocating unanswered federal questions to federal courts,
just as the federal courts conserve resources by certifying to their state
counterparts. And reverse certification would provide many of the
same benefits to litigants and the legal system—it would increase
uniformity in results and reduce the likelihood of splits between state
high courts and federal courts of appeals.
In addition to its practical benefits, reverse certification would
increase institutional comity between the courts. Certification in its
current form is motivated in part by a desire to conserve resources in
the federal courts. But many state courts are likewise burdened by
heavy dockets.117 A reverse certification procedure would represent a
reciprocal desire by both state and federal courts to share caseloads
and allocate lawmaking duties efficiently. Furthermore, reverse
certification has few apparent downsides. As a completely
discretionary procedure, it does not threaten to add a higher workload
than the federal courts can bear.118 In short, many of certification’s

115. See Clark, supra note 84, at 1545–46 (“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States . . .
prais[ed] the Florida legislature’s ‘rare foresight’ in authorizing certification, and suggest[ed] that
the court of appeals on remand attempt to obtain an authoritative determination of ‘two
unresolved state law questions’ by certifying them to the Florida Supreme Court.”); Chesin &
Lin, supra note 96 (“Frequent use of the certification process has been the norm in the Second
Circuit since the mid-1990s, when Judge Calabresi joined the court and became a vocal and
persuasive advocate for use of the procedure.”).
116. The practical and symbolic benefits of certification are discussed at greater length later
in this Note. See infra Part II.B.1.
117. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIGHVOLUME DOCKETS 2 (2016) (noting that high volume dockets in state courts present “enormous
challenges to litigants, judges and court administrators” that “threaten the integrity of judicial
processes and can thwart meaningful examination of basic facts and claims”).
118. A later section of this Note discusses when state courts might certify questions and argues
that the discretionary use of certification is unlikely to overburden the federal courts. See infra
Part II.B.3.
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benefits could work both ways, and without significantly disrupting the
status quo.
It may seem surprising, then, that few scholars have considered the
proposal. Out of the few scholarly discussions on the topic, most
address the idea only in a footnote or during a brief aside.119 However,
at least two scholars have given more serious thought to the idea.120
And others have proposed reforms with similar goals. Judge Jon
Newman, for example, proposed that federal issues arising in state
court could be appealed from a state’s highest court to the federal
courts of appeals.121
When considering certification of federal questions by state
courts, several questions immediately arise: Would the benefits
outweigh the costs? How would it work? When, and how often, would it
be used? This Part aims to answer these questions and more.122 Two
approaches to reverse certification are considered: certification by
state courts directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, and certification to the
courts of appeals in which the state court sits. Between these two
approaches, the second is arguably more viable, and will receive more
attention.
A. Certification by State Courts to the U.S. Supreme Court
In some respects, the U.S. Supreme Court is a logical candidate
for receiving certified questions from the state courts. The Supreme
Court is the only court that can provide a definitive ruling on federal
law, just as the state supreme courts provide definitive rulings on state
law.123 Furthermore, the state courts, with few exceptions, view the
Supreme Court as the only federal court that can bind them on federal
issues.124 However, the proposal would need to proceed with cautious
119. See supra note 37 (describing the scholarship).
120. See supra note 38 (referencing the two scholars who have explored the proposal in
greater depth).
121. See Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals To Preserve the
Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 774–76 (1989) (describing a system of “reciprocal
routing of appeals” between federal and state courts).
122. The question whether such proposals would be constitutional, however, is dealt with in
Part III.
123. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976)
(“We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of [state] law by the highest court of the
State.”).
124. See Frost, supra note 15, at 63 (“[A]t least a few state supreme courts appear to consider
themselves bound by lower federal court decisions on questions of federal law, although that
number has shrunk in recent years.”).

MACY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/17/2021 3:19 PM

926

[Vol. 71:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

awareness of the Supreme Court’s limited docket. Ideally, any
plausible proposal for allowing certification from state courts to the
Supreme Court would need to be either extremely limited,125
discretionary, or both. But allowing for discretionary certification
alongside certiorari might seem pointless. Indeed, certified questions
might be treated in the same manner as petitions for certiorari, with
similarly low prospects for review. However, there are some reasons to
believe that adding certification as an additional avenue for Supreme
Court review of state court decisions would be valuable.
First, a certified question may be more obviously capable of
review. The Supreme Court cannot review state court decisions that
rest on an adequate and independent state law ground.126 In other
words, a federal issue must be at least partially determinative of the
state court case for the Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction on
review. Under Michigan v. Long,127 a state court decision discussing
federal law is generally considered to be motivated by federal law in
the absence of a clear expression by the state court to the contrary.128
While Michigan v. Long simplifies the inquiry, certification may
simplify it even further. A certified question would amount to a clear
message from the state supreme court that it believes that state law is
not adequate to resolve the dispute.129 If it were, certification would not
be necessary. Of course, a state court could be wrong about the
necessity of federal law, but certification could streamline the inquiry
by isolating the federal question to be considered.
Second, a certified question reflects deference to Supreme Court
authority. Some scholars suggest that the Supreme Court may see
review of state court decisions as a more solemn affair than when the
Court reviews decisions from the courts of appeals.130 Unlike the

125. For an example of such an extremely limited proposal, see Logan, supra note 16, at 273
(proposing that state courts should be able to certify questions to the U.S. Supreme Court but
only in the limited circumstance of “intrastate, state-federal circuit court conflicts”).
126. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (“[W]here the judgment of a state
court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our
jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to
support the judgment.”).
127. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
128. Id. at 1040–41.
129. This assumes that a federal certification statute would only allow federal questions to be
certified if they were necessary and dispositive of the case. Many state statutes include such a
requirement. See infra note 155 (citing to state statutes referencing certification requirements).
130. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 199–200 (2018) (noting that one
possible explanation for the infrequency of Supreme Court review of state court decisions could
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federal appellate courts, state courts are not participants in the same
judicial system as the Supreme Court, and certiorari review of the state
courts can seem more intrusive. The Supreme Court may be more
hesitant to review the decisions of a state’s highest court in an attempt
to “dignify the independent sovereign status of the state courts.”131
Certification, in contrast to certiorari, would reflect explicit consent by
the state court for Supreme Court review. Thus, the Supreme Court
may be more comfortable answering certified questions.
While these benefits may be small, the downsides to allowing state
courts to certify questions to the Supreme Court would likewise be
small. Certified questions would be unlikely to significantly affect the
number of cases brought before the Court, as state judges would likely
be aware of the gravitas involved in certifying a question to the
Supreme Court. But that awareness might also dissuade state judges
from certifying altogether, especially if there were an alternative
option to certify to the courts of appeals, which will be discussed below.
It is worth noting, though, that the process would be somewhat
reciprocal. The Supreme Court has itself certified questions to the state
supreme courts on several occasions.132 But, for better or worse, the
Supreme Court’s nature makes it perhaps less likely to answer certified
questions in return. The next Section considers a much more likely
candidate for certification.
B. Certification by State Courts to the Federal Courts of Appeals
Allowing state courts to certify federal questions to the courts of
appeals is a far more intuitive proposal. The federal appellate courts
oversee extensive dockets and are designed to resolve legal issues that
have a prior procedural history.133 Furthermore, as discussed
previously, the courts of appeals frequently take advantage of state
certification statutes, and thus, there would be a degree of reciprocity
in asking them to answer certified questions in return. It is not
surprising, then, that the sparse academic commentary considering

be that “the National Court has come to see infrequent review of state court decisions as a way
to convey respect for the state courts,” but ultimately arguing that infrequent review does not
necessarily convey respect).
131. Id. at 199.
132. See Tyler, supra note 62, at 1325 n.88 (collecting six cases in which the United States
Supreme Court certified a question of state law to the highest court of a state).
133. The nature of the circuit courts of appeals as intermediate appellate courts makes them
a far more sensible target for certification than the federal district courts since the federal district
courts cannot provide precedential proclamations on federal law.
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reverse certification has focused on this proposal.134 In the most
extensive discussion to date, Professor Andrew Bradt considers
certification to the federal courts of appeals as a potential response to
the increasing number of federal issues being resolved by state courts
after the decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue
Engineering & Manufacturing.135 Some of the benefits and roadblocks
considered by Bradt will be discussed below, alongside other benefits
and challenges. This Section aims to discuss, in detail, reverse
certification as a policy proposal. The advantages of reverse
certification will be elucidated through the answers to three questions:
(1) What would the benefits of reverse certification be?; (2) How
would reverse certification work?; and (3) When would reverse
certification be utilized?
1. What Would the Benefits of Reverse Certification Be? Although
the motivations for allowing state courts to certify questions of federal
law are slightly different than those animating certification of questions
of state law, there is much overlap. The following discussion reveals
that many of the institutional benefits of certification can be felt by
state courts and federal courts alike, and litigants may reap some of the
benefits as well. In general, the benefits of reverse certification can be
separated into three different categories: judicial efficiency,
uniformity, and comity. The first two benefits could be classified as
practical and the third as symbolic.
First, reverse certification would provide state courts with a tool
for conserving judicial resources and allocating them more efficiently.
Since certification is a discretionary tool that relies on courts being
motivated to use it, this benefit cannot be understated. While state
courts are often called upon to answer questions of federal law, some

134. From my review, only one scholar has suggested that the state courts should be able to
certify questions to the Supreme Court, and, even then, only in a very limited capacity. See supra
note 125. On the other hand, certification to the federal courts of appeals has been entertained
on more occasions. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1211 (“Although one could envision an argument
that any federal certification process should be to only the U.S. Supreme Court, the courts of
appeals would be superior tribunals for certification.”); Gugliuzza, supra note 37 (considering, in
a footnote, whether allowing state courts to certify questions to the Federal Circuit could help
break the “cycle of removal” in patent litigation).
135. Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005); see Bradt, supra
note 29, at 1208 (“If part of the problem created by . . . wide-ranging discretion . . . to decline
jurisdiction under Grable is that important federal questions are left to state tribunals, that
problem could be mitigated by . . . allowing federal courts to answer those embedded questions,
while keeping the entire case in state courts.”).
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federal issues may be highly specialized and niche and may come to
state courts only infrequently. Issues involving intellectual property
law or complex federal statutes are possible examples. But certification
would not merely be an opportunity for state courts to offload
complicated questions onto the federal courts, it would allow for a
more efficient allocation of judicial resources. Federal judges are more
likely to be experienced in answering complex issues involving, for
example, the interpretation of federal statutes. Thus, it is plausible to
argue that such questions could be answered more efficiently by the
federal courts,136 just as the state courts could be more efficient at
answering questions of state law. Furthermore, as Bradt notes, making
certification reciprocal might make certification more efficient
overall.137 Both federal and state courts would have an incentive to
swiftly answer questions certified to them, as they would want their
own certified questions to be answered quickly in return.
Second, reverse certification would advance the interests of
litigants in the uniform resolution of federal issues. In the abstract,
litigants may feel as if the resolution of a federal issue is more correct
when adjudicated by a federal court.138 Litigants may also feel
dissatisfied when a state court resolves a federal issue and a federal
court later disagrees in a different case. Since reverse certification
would allow more issues to be resolved in federal courts, it would help
ameliorate both of these concerns. More concretely, reverse
certification could reduce forum shopping by disincentivizing the use
of artful pleading to avoid federal court resolution of federal issues,
since the federal issues would have an additional pathway to reaching
federal court. It may also lead to a more uniform administration of
federal law overall by reducing the likelihood that there will be a split
between a state court and a federal appellate court on any given federal
issue. Furthermore, when the appellate court answers a certified
question, its resolution of the issue would have precedential effect in

136. The efficiency gained here refers to the advantages federal courts have in resolving
federal questions due to their experience and expertise. See sources cited supra note 33.
Certification would not necessarily make the process more efficient for litigants since the process
will inevitably be slowed by the procedural demands of certification.
137. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1215 (“There may even be an incentive on the part of the
courts of appeals to respond to certified questions expeditiously in hopes that they will benefit
from similar treatment when certifying their own questions to the states.”).
138. But see Selya, supra note 36, at 690 (“[L]itigants do not have an entitlement to something
identifiable in the abstract as a ‘right’ answer.”).
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federal courts throughout the circuit;139 thus, reverse certification
would provide the federal courts of appeals with additional
opportunities to develop precedent that could be applied consistently
to future litigants.
Third, reverse certification would advance institutional comity
between federal and state courts. As discussed above, certification of
state law questions is in part motivated by the laborious task imposed
on federal courts charged with resolving state law issues. However, the
unilateral nature of certification may overvalue the resources of the
federal courts and undervalue the resources of the state courts. The
overwhelming size of the federal docket has been firmly established,140
but state courts are faced with significant dockets as well.141 Proposals
for reducing the federal docket often involve shifting more burdens
onto the state courts.142 Similarly, unilateral certification allows federal
courts to capitalize on state court labor without any analogous tool for
states to request the help of the federal courts. There is a risk, then,
that certification as currently practiced sends a message to the state
courts that their time is less important. On the other hand, state courts
retain discretion to reject certified questions, and the success of
certification in some circuits implies that state courts are receptive to
answering at least some state law questions that arise in federal cases.143
And some circuits have made clear that the decision to certify should
be motivated by deference and not the difficulty of answering state law
questions.144 It might be more fair, though, for there to be some give
and take in the certification process.145 A bilateral system of

139. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1213 (“When the circuit court opines on a particular question,
its opinion would become binding law throughout the circuit . . . .”).
140. See generally Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal
Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789,
843–69 (2020) (collecting data concerning the growing dockets of the federal courts).
141. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 117 (reporting on case volumes in state
courts).
142. See Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76
JUDICATURE 187, 194 (1992) (arguing in favor of allocating more cases to the state courts as an
alternative to increasing the size of the federal judiciary); Calabresi, supra note 37, at 1297–98
(proposing that a significant number of criminal cases be shifted to state courts to alleviate the
federal docket).
143. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (noting that several circuits have made use
of certification and that states have been largely receptive).
144. Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003).
145. Of course, nearly every state has passed a certification statute despite the fact that federal
courts do not accept certified questions. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. The
unilateral nature of the procedure has not dissuaded states from embracing it.
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certification would emphasize that certification is motivated by
deference and the efficient allocation of judicial resources, not merely
the assistance of one court at the expense of the other.
Relative to these benefits, the costs of a certification procedure
can be minimized. There are several costs to consider: certification will
add to the workload of the federal courts, create delays for litigants
whose issues are certified, and raise possible federal constitutional
concerns. The next Subsection will discuss how reverse certification
might be structured as to reduce these costs.146 Following that, Section
II.B.3, which discusses when reverse certification might be used, will
argue that its discretionary use is unlikely to overburden the federal
courts or substantially burden litigants.147 Finally, Part III of this Note
will discuss constitutional concerns in greater detail.148
2. How Would Reverse Certification Work? Establishing a process
for reverse certification would likely require legislative action by both
the states and Congress. The states would probably need to enact
legislation empowering their courts to certify questions, and Congress
would likely need to enact a statute allowing the federal courts to
receive and answer said questions.149 The multiplicity of state
certification statutes shows that a statute can take many forms. In
general, the state statutes specify three elements: (1) which courts can
certify questions,150 (2) which courts can accept certified questions,151
and (3) any other restrictions intended to calibrate the use of
certification.152 A federal statute would need to contemplate these
elements as well.
As for which courts would be able to certify, a practical proposal
would be to restrict certification to a state’s highest court. In some

146. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how reverse certification might work).
147. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing when reverse certification might be used).
148. See infra Part III (arguing that reverse certification would be constitutionally
permissible).
149. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1208 n.240 (opining that legislative action on behalf of both
the States and Congress would be necessary to implement a reverse certification scheme).
150. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 2:12A-1 (specifying that questions may be certified to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey only by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).
151. See, e.g., WYO. R. APP. P. 11.01 (“The supreme court may answer questions of law
certified to it . . . .”).
152. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 51-1A-3 (2021) (“The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia may answer a question of law certified to it . . . if the answer may be determinative of an
issue in a pending cause in the certifying court and if there is no controlling appellate decision,
Constitutional provision or statute of this state.”).
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cases, this may dilute the benefits of certification, as there would at
times be two layers of discretion insulating a federal issue from review
in federal court. However, it would be preferable to limit certification
to a small number of courts; there would, after all, be courts from fifty
different states, and possibly several territories, that would be
empowered to certify questions. Restricting the power to certify
questions to a state’s highest court would ensure that certification
remains a relatively solemn affair. Furthermore, it would require a
greater consensus of state judges to decide to certify, as courts of last
resort typically have the largest panels of any court in a state.153 As
discussed in Part II.A, it makes the most sense for federal questions to
be certified to the courts of appeals. Given that, it is intuitive that a
state court would be able to certify questions to the circuit within which
it is geographically situated. For instance, the Supreme Court of
California could certify questions to the Ninth Circuit, and so on.154
Certification could be calibrated in other ways as well. A federal
statute would likely require that the issue be unresolved and
determinative in the case, as many state certification statutes do.155 It
could also require that certified questions arise from a case that fulfills
the requirements of Article III standing.156 The statute could also
provide for supplemental briefing and oral argument by the parties,
either as an option or a requirement.157 Congress could also use various
tools to limit the use of certification. For example, Congress could set
an amount-in-controversy requirement for certified questions.158 But
153. Yosh Halberstam, Trial and Error: Decision Reversal and Panel Size in State Courts, 32
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 94, 98 (2015).
154. That said, there are limited circumstances where it would be beneficial to allow the state
courts to certify questions to other circuits as well. It would make sense, for example, to allow
high courts from any state to certify a question of patent law to the Federal Circuit.
155. See supra note 152; CAL. R. CT. 8.548(a) (“[T]he Supreme Court may decide a question
of California law if: (1) The decision could determine the outcome of a matter pending in the
requesting court; and (2) There is no controlling precedent.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West
2021) (allowing certification only when the state law questions “are determinative of the said
cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this
state”).
156. See infra Part III.B (discussing the relationship between reverse certification and Article
III standing).
157. Supreme Court Rule 19, the rule that enables the circuit courts of appeals to certify
questions to the Supreme Court, requires the parties to submit briefs when a question is certified.
See SUP. CT. R. 19(3) (“When a question is certified . . . the Clerk will submit the certificate to the
Court for a preliminary examination to determine whether the case should be briefed, set for
argument, or dismissed.”).
158. Such a limit might be undesirable, though. The amount in controversy in a litigation is
not always a good measure for the complexity or importance of federal questions that may exist.
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there is reason to believe that extensive statutory restrictions would not
be necessary. Current certification practice suggests that state courts
would develop doctrines that guide the decision to certify, and the
federal courts would give feedback when accepting or dismissing
certified questions.159 Thus, the courts would likely develop a mutual
understanding regarding whether certification is appropriate in each
case. Furthermore, the federal courts would be vigilant against any
constitutional issues that may prevent the resolution of a particular
certified question, such as a lack of Article III standing.
There is an additional question regarding who within a circuit
would decide to accept or dismiss a certified question. One possibility
is that the initial question of whether to accept could be heard by a
motions panel in the relevant circuit. If accepted, the certified question
would then be sent to a merits panel for resolution of the legal issues.
Or the initial inquiry and the merits could be resolved simultaneously.
Certified questions could be assigned similar to routine appeals—one
three-judge panel could make the decision whether to accept the
certified question, and then that same panel would either issue an
opinion answering the question or respond with a dismissal.160
There are other ways certified questions could be reviewed as well.
For example, Bradt posits that the circuit’s chief judge or an en banc
panel could decide whether to accept a question.161 However, each of
these alternatives has disadvantages. Leaving the decision to the chief
judge of the circuit may give too much discretion to one judge, and it
could risk overloading the chief judge’s already heavy administrative
workload.162 And leaving decisions to en banc panels might be
Many significant federal questions arise in circumstances where the monetary value of the
litigation does not represent what is at stake.
159. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text (describing certification criteria
developed by federal courts); supra note 111 (noting cases where state courts provided feedback
to federal courts regarding certification).
160. It may be beneficial for a discretionary rejection to be accompanied by a brief opinion
detailing the reasons for the rejection. The opinion could help guide state high courts in future
decisions to certify. However, the state courts have not always been so helpful in explaining their
reasons for rejecting a certified question. See Schneider, supra note 70, at 315–16 (“The Michigan
Supreme Court, to say the least, is not very receptive to the certified question. Not only does the
court refuse to answer most questions, but it generally fails to state the reasons for its refusal.”).
161. Bradt, supra note 29, at 1210 n.251. Bradt also proposes using a rotating three-judge
panel, which is more akin to my proposal. Id.
162. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and
Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2008) (listing the
administrative duties of a chief circuit judge and noting that the duties “often appear significant
in their demand on a chief’s time”).
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inefficient.163 Ultimately, different circuits could establish different
procedures for dealing with certified questions that reflect the policy
preferences of the circuit, unless Congress specifies a uniform
procedure.164
3. When Would Reverse Certification Be Utilized? Even if reverse
certification were available as a procedure, there might be a concern
that it would not be used. Indeed, one might think that the lack of
discussion on the topic evinces a lack of desire. One might also
remember, though, that there was not a vocal desire among the federal
courts for state certification. Florida’s pathbreaking certification
statute lay dormant for fifteen years until the U.S. Supreme Court
decided to take advantage, and certification is now a common
practice.165 That said, there are plausible concerns regarding the
attractiveness of reverse certification. State courts are commonly called
upon to answer questions of federal law, and they generally do not have
abstention doctrines that counsel deference to federal court decisionmaking. Moreover, the federal courts have crushing dockets and might
not be thrilled to open themselves to more work. The following
discussion describes when state courts might want to certify questions
and argues that federal courts would have incentives to answer. The
value of reverse certification, however, does not depend on these
instances occurring frequently. Even if used sparingly, reverse
certification can be a valuable tool for courts and litigants.
As previously discussed, state courts might want to certify when
they are faced with complicated issues of federal law with which they
have little interest. If the federal issue is one that infrequently arises in
a state court, the court will likely have no precedent, and accordingly,
there will be little benefit to building precedent. If the issue will be
resolved by the federal courts nine times out of ten, or perhaps more,

163. The number of judges involved in an en banc proceeding can greatly increase the
decision-making time and the expenditure of judicial resources. See Irving R. Kaufman, Do the
Costs of the En Banc Proceeding Outweigh Its Advantages?, 69 JUDICATURE 7, 7 (1985)
(describing the costs and delays caused by en banc proceedings).
164. The federal courts of appeals often diverge in administrative practices based on the
policy goals of the circuit. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and
Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 368–73 (2011) (finding that
nonuniformity in case-management practices among the circuit courts is in part due to differences
in priorities among those courts).
165. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (describing the historical roots of federalstate certification); supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (presenting data on the frequency
of federal-state certification).
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why not defer to the federal courts? Indeed, many state courts do defer
to the federal courts of appeals by citing their decisions as persuasive
authority and adopting their interpretations.166 If the state courts are
willing to cite to the federal courts as persuasive authority for resolved
federal issues, it is not a stretch to suggest that the state courts would
be willing to defer to those same courts for unresolved federal issues.
Certification would provide state courts with an opportunity to defer
in such circumstances.
Another factor that might motivate certification is the desire to
avoid splits of authority. When called upon to resolve a question of
federal law, state courts are especially reluctant to disrupt
uniformity.167 In some circumstances, the state court may be convinced
that its legal interpretation is correct and will be willing to disagree with
the federal court.168 But when a state court has little interest in the
resolution of a niche federal issue, it might prefer to use certification to
allow the courts of appeals to battle over the correct interpretation.
Furthermore, as has been alluded to above, the state courts might
be motivated to certify in order to save time. State courts have busy
dockets,169 and it might take greater than usual effort to resolve a
complex federal issue for which little precedent exists. The state court
might find certification to effectively conserve resources in such
circumstances. Of course, the court’s desire to save time must also be
balanced against the value of speedy and efficient justice. Some judges
have pointed out that certification can significantly delay litigation.170
A state court could balance these concerns by looking to the

166. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (providing examples of instances in which state
courts followed federal decisions).
167. See State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enter., 984 N.E.2d 449, 464 (Ill. 2013) (“Because we
find the goal of developing a uniform body of law to be important, we must accord more deference
to federal court interpretations when those interpretations are unanimous.”); NASDAQ OMX
PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Sec., 52 A.3d 296, 303 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“Whenever possible,
Pennsylvania state courts follow the Third Circuit so that litigants do not improperly ‘walk across
the street’ to achieve a different result in federal court than would be obtained in state court.”).
168. See, e.g., State Bank of Cherry, 984 N.E.2d at 464 (“[W]e may choose not to follow
Seventh Circuit or uniform lower federal court precedent if we find that precedent to be wrongly
decided because we determine the decision to be without logic or reason.”).
169. Supra note 117 and accompanying text.
170. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(“[Certification] entails more delay and expense than would an ordinary decision of the state
question on the merits by the federal court.”); Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins., 919 F.3d 992,
994 (6th Cir. 2019) (Clay, J., concurring) (stating that resort to certification in diversity cases
“serve[s] little purpose other than to needlessly delay resolution of the ultimate issues in the
case”).
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complexity of the issues and the length of the litigation up to that point.
In some cases, one or both of the parties may prefer that the issues be
certified, even if the procedure results in delays. Indeed, sometimes
federal courts are moved to certify questions to the state courts by the
litigants themselves.171 These litigants likely understand that
certification may come with additional delay, but they have determined
that it is worthwhile to have their state law claim adjudicated by a state
forum. It is plausible that some litigants would have similar motivations
in state court and would be willing to accept delays in return for limited
access to a federal forum.
There is a further question, though, of whether the federal courts
would be willing to accept certified questions from the state courts. The
near death of certification to the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates
that courts are reluctant to certify when the receiving court consistently
refuses to answer.172 However, the federal courts of appeals may not be
as hesitant to accept certified questions as some might expect. While it
is true that the federal courts of appeals are not wanting for more
work,173 certified questions are likely to present legal issues that the
federal courts have a distinct interest in taking on. As has been
discussed, certification would only be necessary in the case of
unresolved and difficult federal issues, and certified questions would
present federal judges with an opportunity to create new precedents
for their circuits. Certification, if used efficiently,174 would provide
federal judges with opportunities to answer questions that they are
interested in answering: those that involve complex and novel issues of
federal law.

171. One study examined the initiating activity leading to certified questions in three federal
courts of appeals. Although certification by sua sponte order was more common, each circuit also
certified questions on the motion of a party. CERTIFICATION IN THE THIRD, SIXTH, AND NINTH
CIRCUITS, supra note 92, at 5, 7, 9.
172. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (recounting how the Supreme Court’s
persistent refusal to hear certified questions led to the death of certification).
173. The judicial commentary on crushing caseloads is extensive. See, e.g., Debra Cassens
Weiss, Judges Tell of Case Delays, High Caseloads as House Committee Considers Expanding
Judgeships, ABA J. (Feb. 25, 2021, 12:08 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judgestell-of-case-delays-and-high-caseloads-as-house-committee-considers-expanding-judgeships
[https://perma.cc/RYU7-8YQR] (providing recent examples of increased caseload volume); Jon
O. Newman, The Current Challenge of Federal Court Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 905, 910–12
(2020) (discussing the adverse consequences of increased caseload volume).
174. As it probably would be. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (explaining
that both federal and state courts have used judicial self-regulation in order to use certification
more effectively).
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Even so, it is difficult to predict how frequently reverse
certification would be utilized. But, whatever the case may be, there
are few downsides to simply making the tool available. If certification
were used only sparingly by the state courts, then the tool might still be
worthwhile in that small subset of cases that present complicated and
unresolved federal issues. If certification were used too frequently,
then the federal courts could react by tightening their criteria for
accepting certified questions. The worst-case scenario would be if the
federal courts tightened the criteria as to dissuade certification
altogether, as the Supreme Court has done.175 Ultimately, however, the
courts of appeals would have at least some incentives to accept and
answer certified questions, and it cannot be easily presumed that the
federal courts would reject them altogether.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REVERSE CERTIFICATION
Now that the theoretical benefits of reverse certification have
been discussed, there remains the critical issue of whether such a
procedure could be implemented consistent with the Constitution. The
scholars who have considered reverse certification question its
consistency with Article III’s grant of judicial power.176 This Section
considers the constitutional challenges to reverse certification and
ultimately concludes that the procedure would be constitutional. Of
course, federal courts would need to scrutinize certified questions to
determine whether the federal issue is truly determinative and whether
the underlying dispute qualifies as a case or controversy for Article III
purposes.177 But this is nothing new—every case must be scrutinized to

175. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (recounting how the Supreme Court’s
persistent refusal to hear certified questions led to the death of certification); Nielson, supra note
45, at 489 (describing how the Supreme Court discouraged the practice of certification through
“[c]urt per curiam dismissals” (alteration in original) (quoting James William Moore & Allan D.
Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV.
1, 22 n.87 (1949))).
176. See Selya, supra note 36 (“[F]ederal courts would likely resist the fiction that certified
questions are not advisory opinions.”); Berman et al., supra note 37 (positing that reverse
certification would “rais[e] difficult issues under Article III’s prohibition on advisory opinions”).
177. As Article III provides,
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, . . . to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a
State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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answer preliminary issues of jurisdiction.178 A federal certification
statute could easily specify that certified questions must arise from
underlying cases that satisfy the requirements of Article III, or federal
judges could make the inquiry themselves. This Part will first discuss
concerns that certification would entail the issuance of advisory
opinions. Following that, it will discuss concerns related to Article III
standing.
A. Advisory Opinions
By and large, the most significant alleged defect of certification
procedure is that it would require the federal courts to issue
unconstitutional advisory opinions. This concern rests on two elements
of certification procedure. First, an answer to a certified question may
seem too many steps removed from a “case or controversy,”179 as it
requires the federal courts to answer a discrete question extracted from
a broader case. Second, there may be a concern that answers to
certified questions are not sufficiently final, as they rely on state courts
for implementation.
In response to the first concern, Bradt argues that an answer to a
certified question would be akin to a declaratory judgment, not an
advisory opinion.180 Like a proper request for a declaratory judgment,
a certified question asks a federal court to resolve “a discrete issue that
is in actual, not theoretical, dispute.”181 In the declaratory judgment
context, the Supreme Court has stated that a federal court opinion is
not an advisory opinion “so long as the case retains the essentials of an
adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy,
which is finally determined by the judgment below.”182 Thus, if state
and federal courts appropriately screen certified questions to ensure
that adversity, finality, and Article III standing are present, there will

178. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900) (“On every writ of error
or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction . . . [t]his question the court is
bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested . . . .”); see also Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (acknowledging that some cases “dilute[]
the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question,” but
nonetheless reaffirming the rule).
179. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974) (“The complaint failed to satisfy the
threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the
power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy.”).
180. Bradt, supra note 29, at 1216.
181. Id.
182. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).
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be “a real, not a hypothetical” controversy for the federal courts to
resolve.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has had the power to answer
certified questions virtually from its inception.183 This power indicates
that the extraction of a discrete question of law from a broader case is
not problematic for the federal courts. It seems clear, then, that a
certified question can appropriately be answered so long as the
underlying case satisfies Article III requirements.
That said, concerns related to finality could persist despite the
character of the underlying dispute. The federal courts can screen
certified questions to ensure that true adversity and standing are
present, but they would rely on the state courts to render final decisions
incorporating their answers. One might worry that state courts, who
largely see themselves as not bound by lower federal court decisions,184
could receive an answer to a certified question and simply disregard it.
If state courts have discretion to disregard answers to certified
questions, then those answers could be nonbinding advisory
opinions.185 This would be odd given that the state court decided to
certify the question in the first place. It could be argued that
certification constitutes an implicit concession by the state court that
the federal court decision will be final and that the federal court can
rely on the “good faith” of the state court to follow its answer.186
Relying on the good faith of state courts is not new. There is at
least one other context where this happens: when the Supreme Court
remands a case to a state court after delivering an opinion on the
merits.187 Furthermore, Congress could possibly mandate in the
183. See supra Part I.A (describing the power of lower federal courts to certify questions to
the Supreme Court and its historical background).
184. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 15 (describing the differing approaches of state courts toward
using lower federal court precedent.).
185. See Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (“Judgments
within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully
be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”). But
see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570–71 (1962) (holding that the federal courts could rely
on the “good faith” of the United States to honor money judgments rendered by the Court of
Claims, even though Congress could hypothetically refuse to make an appropriation to fulfill
judgments over a particular amount).
186. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 571.
187. The Supreme Court continues to do this even though the state courts will at times evade
the Court’s mandates. See generally Jerry K. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme
Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 260 (1972)
(examining instances where state courts exercised discretion on remand in a manner inconsistent
with Supreme Court mandates).
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certification statute that answers to certified questions are binding on
the state courts despite the fact that they come from a lower federal
court.188 But Congress would not necessarily need to mandate that
answers to certified questions are binding as a matter of precedent. All
that is needed to avoid a finality issue is that the federal court
resolution of the federal issue be determinative between the parties in
the case.189 Indeed, every federal court of appeals recognizes its own
power to issue nonprecedential opinions.190 Although it might enhance
reciprocity to give answers to certified questions precedential effect in
the state courts, it would not be constitutionally necessary.
B. Standing
Standing is closely related to the prohibition of advisory opinions.
If a federal court were to answer a certified question, the question
would need to arise from an underlying case that qualifies as a “case or
controversy” for the purposes of Article III. For an actual controversy
to exist, the plaintiff in the underlying case would need to have had
Article III standing to bring their original claim.191 This is important to
note because many state courts have more relaxed standing
requirements than the federal courts.192 Thus, a federal issue may make
its way to a state’s highest court even though it would have never made
it through a federal court’s front door. As a result, certification would
be inappropriate in state cases presenting federal questions where the

188. It has been persuasively argued that Congress has the power to declare that the decisions
of lower federal courts on issues of federal law are binding on the state courts. See Frost, supra
note 15, at 81–83 (arguing that Congress could require state courts to follow precedent set by the
lower federal courts pursuant to the Inferior Tribunals Clause, Art. I, § 8).
189. Finality is achieved when a judicial decision is the “last word” for a “particular case or
controversy.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (“Having achieved finality,
however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a
particular case or controversy.”).
190. See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 188 MICH. L. REV. 533, 549–51 (2020) (examining data regarding
the use of nonprecedential unpublished opinions in all federal courts of appeals except for the
Federal Circuit but noting that unpublished opinions are used in the Federal Circuit as well).
191. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[S]tanding is an essential
and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”). There may be one
small exception to this requirement, but it is doubtful. See infra note 193 (discussing the possible
exception).
192. See Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 1836–37 (“State courts, however, are not bound by Article
III, and . . . . [s]ome state courts issue advisory opinions, grant standing to taxpayers challenging
misuse of public funds, and decide important public questions even when federal courts would
consider the disputes moot.”).
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requisites of Article III standing doctrine are not met.193 This is not
fatal to reverse certification, but it does restrict its use.
The variations in standing requirements may also impose
additional burdens on federal courts answering certified questions, as
they would need to be wary of the differing doctrines to conduct their
own inquiry. That said, the system would likely exert pressure on the
state courts to vet cases to avoid being denied for jurisdictional reasons.
Furthermore, a federal certification statute could require state courts
to include a statement of standing along with the certified question. Of
course, a federal court would always have discretion to deny the
certified question after conducting an independent inquiry, but such a
requirement could ensure that state courts do some due diligence
before certifying a question.
CONCLUSION
This Note paints a modest picture of reverse certification as a
policy proposal by establishing that reverse certification would be both
practically feasible and normatively attractive. Reverse certification
would generate benefits for both courts and litigants and would
enhance the symbolic parity of the state and federal courts. In the
absence of significant downsides or constitutional concerns, reverse
certification is a plausible expansion of an interjurisdictional procedure
that has grown significantly in popularity in the past few decades.
This Note does not, however, attempt to establish that Congress
would be likely to create such a tool. It is notable, though, that
certification of state law questions has gathered inertia, and
certification in general will likely remain a common procedure in the
federal judicial system. Lastly, while this Note has responded to
criticisms against reverse certification, it does not tackle the criticisms
of certification in general. This Note does not comprehensively defend
certification, but rather argues that certification should be a two-way

193. There may be some limited circumstances, though, where federal courts could answer
certified questions even if the plaintiff in the underlying case never had standing to bring the
original claim. In ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, the U.S. Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction over a
case on appeal from the Supreme Court of Arizona even though the “plaintiffs in the original
action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts.” 490 U.S. 605,
623 (1989). The Court reasoned that “we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the
judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition
for our review.” Id. at 623–24. However, ASARCO may not extend to the certification context,
as the Court expressly limited its reasoning to “jurisdiction on certiorari,” and specified that the
state court judgment must injure the parties who petition the Supreme Court for review. Id.
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street. In other words, since certification is here to stay, there are good
reasons to consider making it reciprocal.

